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Abstract — This paper presents a new architecture for 
trustworthy autonomic systems. This trustworthy autonomic 
architecture is different from the traditional autonomic 
computing architecture and includes mechanisms and 
instrumentation to explicitly support run-time self-validation 
and trustworthiness. The state of practice does not lend itself 
robustly enough to support trustworthiness and system 
dependability. For example, despite validating system’s decisions 
within a logical boundary set for the system, there’s the 
possibility of overall erratic behaviour or inconsistency in the 
system emerging for example, at a different logical level or on a 
different time scale. So a more thorough and holistic approach, 
with a higher level of check, is required to convincingly address 
the dependability and trustworthy concerns. Validation alone 
does not always guarantee trustworthiness as each individual 
decision could be correct (validated) but overall system may not 
be consistent and thus not dependable. A robust approach 
requires that validation and trustworthiness are designed in and 
integral at the architectural level, and not treated as add-ons as 
they cannot be reliably retro-fitted to systems. This paper 
analyses the current state of practice in autonomic architecture, 
presents a different architectural approach for trustworthy 
autonomic systems, and uses a datacentre scenario as the basis 
for empirical analysis of behaviour and performance. Results 
show that the proposed trustworthy autonomic architecture has 
significant performance improvement over existing architectures 
and can be relied upon to operate (or manage) almost all level of 
datacentre scale and complexity.  
Keywords - trustworthy architecture; trustability; validation; 
datacentre; autonomic system; dependability; stability; autonomic 
architecture 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A robust autonomic architecture is a vital key to 
achieving dependable (or trustworthy) autonomic systems. 
We have made initial progress [1] in this direction to address 
the issue of autonomic trustworthiness through adequate run-
time conformance testing as integral part of a trustworthy 
autonomic architecture (different from the traditional 
autonomic architecture). This work is an extension of the 
initial progress and the implementation (with empirical 
analysis) of the new trustworthy architecture. The traditional 
autonomic architecture as originally presented in the 
autonomic computing blueprint [2] has been widely accepted 
and deployed across an ever-widening spectrum of autonomic 
system (AS) design and implementations. Research results in 
the autonomic research community are based, predominantly, 
on the architecture’s basic MAPE (monitor-analyse-plan-
execute) control loop, e.g., [3][4]. Several implementation 
variations of this control loop, for example [5][6], have been 
promoted.  While [5] breaks the MAPE components into two 
main groups with the Monitor/Analyze group handling 
reactive tasks and the Plan/Execute group responsible for 
proactive adaptation, [6] adopts a slightly different approach. 
In [6], the MAPE architecture is divided into global and local 
sub-architectures, which implement Analyze/Planning and 
Monitor/Execute components, respectively. Alternative 
approaches, e.g., the intelligent machine design (IMD) based 
approach [7] have also been proposed. However, research [8] 
shows that most approaches are MAPE [9] based. Despite 
progress made, the traditional autonomic architecture and its 
variations is not sophisticated enough to produce trustworthy 
ASs. A new approach with inbuilt mechanisms and 
instrumentation to support trustworthiness is required. 
At the core of system trustworthiness is validation and 
this has to satisfy run-time requirements. In large systems 
with very wide behavioural space and many dimensions of 
freedom, it is close to impossible to comprehensively predict 
possible outcomes at design time. So it becomes highly 
complex to make sure or determine whether the autonomic 
manager’s (AM’s) decision(s) are in the overall interest and 
good of the system. There is a vital need, then, to dynamically 
validate the run-time decisions of the AM to avoid the system 
‘shooting itself in the foot’ through control brevity, i.e., either 
too loose or too tight control leading to unresponsive or 
unstable system respectively. The traditional autonomic 
architecture does not explicitly and integrally support run-
time self-validation; a common practice is to treat validation 
and other needed capabilities as add-ons. Identifying such 
challenges, the traditional architecture has been extended 
(e.g., in [10]) to accommodate validation by integrating a self-
test activity into the autonomic architecture. But the question 
is whether validation alone can guarantee trustworthiness.   
The need for trustworthiness in the face of the peculiar 
nature of ASs, (e.g., context dynamism) comes with unique 
and complex challenges validation alone cannot sufficiently 
address. Take for instance; if a manager (AM) erratically 
changes its decision, it ends up introducing noise to the 
system rather than smoothly steering the system. In that 
instance, a typical validation check will pass each correct 
decision (following a particular logic or rule) but this could 
lead to oscillation in the system resulting in instability and 
inconsistent output, which could emerge at a different logical 
level or time scale. A typical example could be an AM that 
follows a set of rules to decide when to move a server to or 
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from a pool of servers; as long as the conditions of the rules 
are met, the AM will move servers around not minding the 
frequency of changes in the conditions.  An erratic change of 
decision (high rate of moving servers around) will cause 
undesirable oscillations that ultimately detriment the system. 
What is required is a kind of intelligence that enables the 
manager to smartly carry out a change only when it is safe 
and efficient to do so – within a particular (defined) safety 
margin. A higher level of self-monitoring to achieve, for 
example, stability over longer time frames, is absent in the 
MAPE-orientated architectures. This is why autonomic 
systems need a different approach. The ultimate goal of the 
new approach is not just to achieve self-management but also 
to achieve consistency and reliability of results through self-
management. These are the core values of the proposed 
architecture in this paper. 
We look at the background of work towards AS 
trustworthy architecture in Section II. We present a new 
trustworthy autonomic architecture in Section III and present 
a datacentre-based implementation and empirical analysis of 
the new architecture in Section IV. Section V concludes the 
work. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The idea espoused in this work is that trustworthiness 
(and any other desired autonomic capability) should be 
conceived at design stage. This means that the autonomic 
architecture should be flexible (and yet robust) enough to 
provide instrumentations that allow designers to specify 
processes to achieve desired goals. It then follows that we 
need to rethink the autonomic architecture. In this section, we 
look at the current state of practice and efforts directed 
towards AS trustworthiness. We analyse few proposed 
trustworthy architectures and some isolated bits of work that 
could contribute to trustworthy autonomic computing. 
Trustworthiness requires a holistic approach, i.e., a long-term 
focus as against the near-term needs that merely address 
methods for building trust into existing systems. This means 
that trustworthiness needs to be designed into systems as 
integral properties. 
Chan et al. [11] asks the critical question of “How can 
we trust an autonomic system to make the best decision?” and 
proposes a ‘trust’ architecture to win the trust of autonomic 
system users. The proposal is to introduce trust into the 
system by assigning an “instantaneous trust index” (ITI) to 
each execution of a system’s AM –where ITI could be 
computed, for example, by examining what fraction of AM 
suggested actions the user accepts unchanged, or by 
examining how extensive the changes that the user makes to 
the suggested actions are. The overall trust index, which 
reflects the system administration’s level of trust in the AM, 
is computed as the function f(ITIi) where i = 1, 2, 3, … and 
ITIi are the individual ITIs for each AM execution. This is 
similar to the proposal in this work in the sense that it 
considers trust as architecture-based and also defines trust in 
the language of the user. However, this method will be overly 
complex (and may be out of control) in large systems with 
multiple AMs if the user is required to moderate every single 
AM suggested action. In such systems some of the AM’s 
decisions are not transparent to the human user. Another 
effort that supports the idea that dependability should be 
conceived at design time and not retro-fitted to systems is the 
work in [12]. Hall and Rapanotti [12] propose an Assurance-
Driven Design and posit that engineering design should 
include the detailing of a design for a solution that guarantees 
satisfaction of set requirements and the construction of 
arguments to assure users that the solution will provide the 
needed functionality and qualities. The key point here is that 
trustworthiness is all about securing the confidence of the user 
(that the system will do what it says) and the way to achieve 
this is by getting the design (architecture) right. This is the 
thrust of this work.  
Shuaib et al. [7] propose a framework that will allow for 
proper certification of A-C systems. Central to this framework 
is an alternative autonomic architecture based on Intelligent 
Machine Design (IMD), which draws from the human 
autonomic nervous system. 
Kikuchi et al. [13] proposes a policy verification and 
validation framework that is based on model checking to 
verify the validity of administrator’s specified policies in a 
policy-based system. Because a known performing policy 
may lead to erroneous behaviour if the system (in any aspect) 
is changed slightly, the framework is based on checking the 
consistency of the policy and the system’s defined model or 
characteristics. This is another important aspect of the 
proposed solution in this work –validation is done with 
reference to the system’s defined goal.  
A trustworthy autonomic grid computing architecture is 
presented in [14]. This is to be enabled through a proposed 
fifth self-* functionality, self-regulating: Self-regulating 
capability is able to derive policies from high-level policies 
and requirements at run-time to regulate self-managing 
behaviours. One concern here is that proposing a fifth 
autonomic functionality to regulate the self-CHOP 
functionalities as a solution to AS trustworthiness assumes 
that trustworthiness can be achieved when all four 
functionalities perform ‘optimally’. This assumption is not 
entirely correct. The self-CHOP functionalities alone do not 
ensure trustworthiness in ASs. Take for example; the self-
CHOP functionalities do not address validation, which is a 
key factor in AS trustworthiness. The self-CHOP (or 
sometimes referred to as self-*) stands for self-Configuring, 
self-Healing, self-Optimising, and self-Protecting. These are 
the characteristics or functional areas that define the 
capabilities of autonomic systems and will be referred to as 
autonomic functionalities in this paper.  
Another idea is that trustworthiness is achieved when a 
system is able to provide accounts of its behaviour to the 
extent that the user can understand and trust. But these 
accounts must, amongst other things, satisfy three 
requirements: provide a representation of the policy guiding 
the accounting, some mechanism for validation and 
accounting for system’s behaviour in response to user 
demands [15]. The system’s actions are transparent to the user 
281
International Journal on Advances in Intelligent Systems, vol 7 no 1 & 2, year 2014, http://www.iariajournals.org/intelligent_systems/
2014, © Copyright by authors, Published under agreement with IARIA - www.iaria.org
and also allow the user (if required) the privilege of 
authorising or not authorising a particular process. This is a 
positive step (at least it provides the user a level of confidence 
and trust) but also important is a mechanism that ensures that 
any ‘authorised’ process does not lead to unreliable or 
misleading results. This is one aspect not considered by many 
research efforts. There are possibilities of erratic behaviour 
(which is not healthy to the system) despite the AM’s 
decisions being approved. One powerful way of addressing 
this challenge is by implementing a dead-zone (DZ) logic 
originally presented in [16]. A DZ, which is a simple 
mechanism to prevent unnecessary, inefficient and ineffective 
control brevity when the system is sufficiently close to its 
target value, is implemented in [16] using Tolerance-Range-
Check (TRC) object. The TRC object encapsulates DZ logic 
and a three-way decision fork that flags which action (left, 
null or right) to take depending on the rules specified. The 
size of the DZ can be dynamically adjusted to suit changes in 
environmental volatility. A key use of this technique is to 
reduce oscillation and ensure stability in the face of high rate 
of adaptability despite process correctness. A mechanism to 
automatically monitor the stability of an autonomic 
component, in terms of the rate the component changes its 
decision (for example when close to a threshold tipping 
point), was presented in [17]. The DecisionChangeInterval 
property is implemented in the AGILE policy language [17] 
on decision making objects such as rules and utility functions. 
This allows the system to monitor itself and take action if it 
detects instability at a higher level than the actual decision 
making activity. This technique is used in the proposed 
solution herein.  
Heo and Abdelzaher [18] present ‘AdaptGuard’, a 
software designed to guard adaptive systems from instability 
resulting from system disruptions. The software is able to 
infer and detect instability and then intervenes (to restore the 
system) without actually understanding the root cause of the 
problem –root-cause-agnostic recovery. Instability is another 
aspect addressed in the solution proposed in our work. 
Because AM control brevity could lead to instability despite 
process correctness, it is important to also consider this 
scenario. Hawthorne et al. [19] demonstrates Teleo-Reactive 
(T-R) programming approach to autonomic software systems 
and shows how T-R technique can be used to detect validation 
issues at design time and thus reducing the cost of validation 
issues. 
Validation is central to achieving trustworthy 
autonomics and this has to meet run-time requirements. A 
generic self-test approach is presented in [10]. The authours 
of [10] extended the MAPE control loop to include a new 
function called Test (Figure 1). By this they define a new 
control loop comprising Monitor, Analyse, Decision, Test and 
Execute –MADTE activities. The MADTE loop works like 
the MAPE loop only that the Decision activity calls the Test 
activity to validate a chosen action should it determine to 
adapt a suggested behaviour. The Test activity carries out a 
test on the action and returns its result to the Decision activity, 
which then decides whether to implement, skip or choose 
another action. (An adaptation is favoured if Test indicates 
that it will lead to component’s better performance in terms of 
characteristics such as optimisation, robustness or security.) 
The process is repeated if the latter is the case. When an 
action is decided on, the decision activity passes it to the 
Execute activity for implementation. This is vital to run-time 
self-validation and is consistent with our proposed solution in 
this work in terms of designing validation into the system’s 
architecture. A feedback-based validation, which relies on a 
kind of secondary (mostly external) expertise feedback to 
validate the output of a system is presented in [20]. This is 
reactionary and has no contribution to the result of the system 
in the first place. Though this may suffice for some specific 
system’s needs, what is generally required for AS validation 
is run-time validation of decisions (or processes) that lead to 
system outputs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It should be noted that AS trustworthiness goes beyond 
secure computing. It is result orientated; not focusing on how 
a goal is achieved but the dependability of the output 
achieved. All systems, no matter how simple or complex, are 
designed to meet a need, but not all systems have security 
concerns. So trustworthiness is not all about security and 
validation. On the other hand, it is not about showing that a 
system or process works but also making sure that it does 
exactly what it is meant to do. This aspect is addressed in the 
proposed trustworthy autonomic architecture by a component 
that carries out a longer term assessment of the system’s 
actions. These are the evolving challenges and where work 
must be concentrated if we are to achieve certifiable 
autonomic systems. 
 
A. Autonomic architecture life-cycle  
We argue that trustworthiness cannot be reliably 
retrofitted into systems but must be designed into system 
architectures. We track autonomic architecture (leading to 
trustworthiness) pictorially in a number of progressive stages 
addressing it in an increasing level of detail and 
sophistication. Figure 2 provides a key to the symbols used. 
 
Figure 1: Control loop with a test function [10] 
Test 
Monitor 
Execute 
Decision 
Analyze 
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Figure 3 illustrates the progression, in sophistication, of 
autonomic architectures and how close they have come to 
achieving trustworthiness. Although this may not be 
exhaustive as several variations and hybrids of the 
combinations may exist, it represents a series of discrete 
progressions in current approaches. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two distinct levels of sophistication are identified: The 
first level represents the traditional autonomic architecture 
(Figure 3 (i) and (ii)) basically concerned with direct self-
management of controlled/monitored system following some 
basic sense-manage-actuate logic defined in AC. For the 
prevailing context, AC is just a container of autonomic 
control logic, which could be based on MAPE or any other 
autonomic control logic. The original autonomic architecture 
proposed with the introduction of autonomic computing [2] 
falls within this level. This achieves basic self-management 
capability and has since been adapted by several researchers 
to offer more smartness and sophistication. To add a degree of 
trust and safeguard, an external interface for user control input 
is introduced in (ii). This chronicles such approaches that 
provide a console for external administrative interactions 
(e.g., real-time monitoring, tweaking, feedback, 
knowledgebase source, trust input, etc.) with the autonomic 
process. An example of level (ii) is work in [15], where the 
system’s actions are transparent to the user and the user can 
moderate the behaviour of the system by allowing or 
disallowing system decided actions. The system has a console 
that offers the user the privilege of authorising or not 
authorising a particular process. Another example in this 
category is unmanned vehicles (UVs). In UVs there are 
provisions for activating auto piloting and manual piloting. 
The user can decide when to activate either or run a hybrid.  
The second level (Figure 3 (iii) and (iv)) represents 
efforts towards addressing run-time validation. 
Instrumentations to enable systems check the conformity of 
management decisions are added. This includes such 
approaches that are capable of run-time self-validation of 
autonomic management decisions. The validation check is 
done by the VC component and the check results in either a 
pass (in which case the validated decision is actuated) or a 
fail. Where the check fails VC sends feedback to AC with 
notification of failure (e.g., policy violation) and new decision 
is generated. An additional layer of sophistication is 
introduced in Figure 3 (iv) with external touch-point for 
higher level of manageability control. This can be in the form 
of an outer control loop monitoring over a longer time frame 
an inner (shorter time frame) control loop. The work in [10] 
(explained in Section II), which is an extension of MAPE 
control to include a ‘Test’ activity corresponds to level (iii) of 
Figure 3. The Test activity tests every suggested action 
(decision) by the plan activity. If the test fails the action is 
dropped and a new one is decided again. The work in [21] 
corresponds to level (iv) of Figure 3. The work in [10] is 
extended in [21] to include auxiliary test services components 
that facilitate manual test management and a detailed 
description of interactions between test managers and other 
components. Here test managers implement closed control 
loops on autonomic managers (such as autonomic managers 
implement on managed resources) to validate change requests 
generated by the autonomic managers. 
At the level of current sophistication (state-of-the-art), 
there are techniques to provide run-time validation check (for 
behavioural and structural conformity), additional console for 
higher level (external) control, etc. Emerging and needed 
capabilities include techniques for managing oscillatory 
behaviour in autonomic systems. These are mainly 
implemented in isolation. What is required is a holistic 
framework that collates all these capabilities into a single 
autonomic unit. Policy autonomics is one of the most used 
autonomic solutions. Autonomic managers (AMs) follow 
rules to decide on actions. As long as policies are validated 
against set rules the AM adapts its behaviour accordingly. 
This may mean changing between states. And when the 
change becomes rapid (despite meeting validation 
requirements) it is capable of introducing oscillation, 
vibration and erratic behaviour (all in form of noise) into the 
system. This is more noticeable in highly sensitive systems. 
So a trustworthy autonomic architecture needs to provide a 
way of addressing these issues. Level (v) of Figure 3 falls 
within the next level of sophistication required to address the 
ValidationCheck 
S 
AC VC 
V
C 
DC 
Sensor (source of ambient/context information) 
Direct control 
AutonomicController 
Actuator (executing autonomic decisions) 
Console for external injection / control / arbiter 
 
Feedback 
DependabilityCheck 
A 
     Figure 2: Pictographic key used for the architecture life-cycle. 
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Figure 3: Pictorial representation of autonomic architecture life-cycles. 
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identified issues and ensure dependability. This is at the core 
of the proposed solution presented in next the Section. 
III. TRUSTWORTHY AUTONOMIC ARCHITECTURE 
This section presents the new trustworthy autonomic 
architecture (TAArch). First, a general view of the 
architecture is presented and then followed by detailed 
explanation of its components. Figure 4 explains a 
trustworthy autonomic framework with three major 
components that embody self-management, self-validation 
and dependability. The architecture builds on the traditional 
autonomic architecture (denoted as the AutonomicController 
(AC) component). Other components include 
ValidationCheck (VC –which is integrated with the decision-
making object of the controller to validate all 
AutonomicController decisions) and DependabilityCheck 
(DC) component, which guarantees stability and reliability 
after validation. The DC component works at a different time 
scale, thus overseas the finer-grained sequence of decisions 
made by the AC and VC. 
The AC component (based on, e.g., MAPE logic, IMD 
framework, etc.) monitors the managed sub-system for 
context information and takes decision for action based on 
this information. The decided action is validated against the 
system’s goal (described as policies) by the VC component 
before execution. If validation fails, (e.g., policy violation) it 
reports back to the AC otherwise the DC is called to ensure 
that outcome does not lead to, for example, instability in the 
system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The DependabilityCheck component comprises of other 
sub-components, which makes it possible to be adapted to 
address different challenges. This feature makes the 
architecture generic and suitable to address even evolving 
autonomic capability requirements. For instance, in [22], the 
architecture is adapted to address interoperability challenges 
in complex interactions between AMs in multi-manager 
scenarios. Predictive component is one example of the 
DependabilityCheck sub-components that allows it to predict 
the outcome of the system based on the validated decision. 
The DependabilityCheck either prevents execution and sends 
feedback in form of some calibration parameters to the 
AutonomicController or calls the actuator to execute the 
validated decision. 
A. Overview of the TAArch architecture components 
This section presents the TAArch architecture in a 
number of progressive stages addressing it in an increasing 
level of detail. First, the self-management process is defined 
as a Sense–Manage–Actuate loop where Sense and Actuate 
define Touchpoints (the autonomic manager’s interface with a 
managed system) and Manage is the embodiment of the 
actual autonomic self-management. Figure 5 is a detailed 
representation of the architectural framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Traditionally, the AutonomicController (AC) senses 
context information, decides (following some rules) on what 
action to take and then executes the action. This is the basic 
routine of any AM and is at the core of most of the autonomic 
architectures in use today (Figure 3). At this level the 
autonomic unit matters but the content of the unit does not 
matter much, i.e., it does not matter what autonomic control 
logic (e.g., MAPE, IMD, etc.) that is employed so long as it 
provides the desired autonomic functionalities. This means 
that the AC component can be configured according to any 
autonomic control logic of choice making the framework 
generic as it is not tied to any one control logic. Basically, the 
AC component introduces some smartness into the system by 
intelligently controlling the decision-making of the system. 
Once an action is decided, following detailed analysis of 
context information, the decision is passed on for execution. 
This is at the level of sophistication defined by the autonomic 
architecture life-cycle level 1 (Figure 3 (i) and (ii)). So, the 
AC component of the TAArch framework provides designers 
the platform to express rules that govern target goal and 
policies that drive decisions on context information for system 
adaptation to achieve the target goal.  
But, the nature of ASs raises one significant concern; 
input variables (context info) are dynamic and (most times) 
not predictable. Although rules and policies are carefully and 
robustly constructed, sensors (data sources) sometimes do 
inject rogue variables that are capable of thwarting process 
Figure 4: Trustworthy autonomic architecture 
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and policy deliberations. In addition, the operating 
environment itself can have varying volatility –causing a 
controller to become unstable in some circumstances. Thus, a 
mechanism is needed to mitigate behavioural (e.g., 
contradiction between two policies, goal distortion, etc.) and 
structural (e.g., illegal structure not conforming to 
requirement, division by zero, etc.) anomalies. This is where 
the ValidationCheck (VC) component comes in. It should be 
noted that AC will always decide on action(s) no matter what 
the input variable is. Once the AC reaches a decision, it 
passes control to the VC, which then validates the decision 
and passes it on for execution. If the check fails, VC sends 
control feedback (CF) to AC while retaining previous passed 
decision. A control feedback is more of an inhibition 
command that controls what actions are and are not allowed 
by the manager. This can be configured according to 
deployment requirements. In a nutshell, the VC, while 
focusing on the goal of the system, deploys self-validation 
mechanisms to continuously perform self-validation of the 
manager’s behaviour and configuration against its behavioural 
goals and also reflects on the quality of the manager’s 
adaptation behaviour. Again, the nature and level of test is 
entirely user-defined. So, the VC is a higher level mechanism 
that oversees the AM to keep the system’s goal on track. The 
ultimate concern here is to maintain system goal adhering to 
defined rules, i.e., adding a level of trust by ensuring that 
target goal is reached only within the boundaries of specified 
rules. It is then left for designers to define what constitute 
validation ‘pass’ and validation ‘fail’. Actual component logic 
are application specific but some examples in literature 
include fuzzy logic [24], reinforcement learning [23], etc. 
This is at the level of sophistication defined by the autonomic 
architecture life-cycle level 2 (Figure 3 (iii) and (iv)). 
But in real life we understand that despite the AM taking 
legitimate decisions within the boundaries of specified rules, 
it is still possible to have overall system behavioural 
inconsistencies. That is, a situation where each individual 
decision could be correct (by logic) and yet the overall 
behaviour is wrong. This kind of situation where the manager 
erratically (though legally) changes its mind, thereby injecting 
oscillation into the system, could be a major concern 
especially in large scale and sensitive systems. This is beyond 
the level of current consideration in the state of practice 
(Figure 3). Therefore, it is necessary to find a way of enabling 
the AM to avoid unnecessary and inefficient change of 
decisions that could lead to oscillation. This task is handled 
by the DC component. It allows the manager change its 
decision (i.e., adapt) only when it is necessary and safe to do 
so. Consider a simple example of a room temperature 
controller in which, it is necessary to track a dynamic goal –a 
target room temperature. The AM is configured to maintain 
the target temperature by automatically switching heating ON 
or OFF according to the logic in (1). A VC would allow any 
decision or action that complies with this basic logic. 
 
 
 
With the lag in adjusting the temperature the system may 
decide to switch ON or OFF heating at every slight tick of the 
gauge below or above target (when room temperature is 
sufficiently close to the target temperature). This may in turn 
cause oscillation, which can lead to undesirable effects. The 
effects are more pronounced in more sensitive and critical 
systems where such changes come at some cost. For example, 
a datacentre management system that erratically switches 
servers between pools at every slight fluctuation in demand 
load is cost ineffective. Actual component and sub-component 
logic are user-defined. One powerful logic example, as 
explained in Section II, for implementing the DC component 
is the dead-zone (DZ) logic [16]. DZ logic has been shown to 
offer a reliable means of achieving self-stabilisation, 
dependable systems and TAC. 
 The DC component may also implement other sub-
components like Prediction, Learning, etc. This enables it to 
predict the outcome of the system and to decide whether it is 
safe to allow a particular decision or not. An example sub-
component logic is Trend Analysis (TA) logic. TA logic 
identifies patterns within streams of information supplied 
directly from different sources (e.g., sensors). By identifying 
trends and patterns within a particular information, (e.g., 
spikes in signal strength, fluctuation in stock price, 
rising/falling trends etc.) the logic enables the AM to make 
more-informed control decisions and this has the potential of 
reducing the number of control adjustments and can improve 
overall efficiency and stability. Also, the analysis of recent 
trends enables a more accurate prediction of the future. With 
TA, managers can base decisions on a more-complete view of 
system behaviour. The usage and importance of TA are 
discussed in more detail in [16]. 
So after validation phase, the DC is called to check 
(based on specified rules) for dependability. DC avoids 
unnecessary and inefficient control inputs to maintain 
stability. If the check passes, control is passed to the Actuator 
otherwise a recalibration feedback (RF) is sent to AC. An 
example of RF is dynamically adjusting (or retuning) the DZ 
boundary width (explained later) as appropriate. The RF 
enables the manager to adjust its behaviour to maintain the 
level of required trust. So, while VC looks at the immediate 
actions, DC takes a longer term view of the manager’s 
behaviour over a certain defined time interval. A particular 
aspect of concern, though, is that for dynamic systems the 
boundary definition of DZ may itself be context dependent 
(e.g., in some circumstances it may be appropriate to allow 
some level of changes, which under different circumstances 
may be considered destabilising). This concern is taken into 
consideration when defining such boundaries. 
So the current state-of-the-art of autonomic architecture 
suffices for short term adaptation. To handle longer term 
frame adaptation, e.g., cases where continuous validation fails 
to guarantee stability and reliability, requires a robust 
autonomic approach. This robust autonomic approach is what 
the proposed TAArch offers. Consider the whole architecture 
as a nested control loop (Figure 4 (b)) with AC the core 
control loop while VC and DC are intermediate and outer 
𝐼𝐹 𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝 <  𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝 𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑁 𝑂𝑁_𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 
𝐼𝐹 𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝 >  𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝 𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑁 𝑂𝐹𝐹_𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 
 
(1) 
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control loops, respectively. In summary, a system, no matter 
the context of deployment, is truly trustworthy when its 
actions are continuously validated (i.e., at run time) to satisfy 
set requirements (system goal) and results produced are 
dependable and not misleading. 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 To demonstrate the feasibility and practicability of the 
new architecture, this section presents an implementation and 
simulation analysis of the TAArch architecture using a 
datacentre case example scenario. This analysis is a complex 
and robust implementation of TAArch demonstrated in a 
resource allocation scenario, which models basic datacentre 
resource allocation management. Although the demonstration 
uses a datacentre scenario, which though offers a way of 
efficiently managing complex datacentres, the application of 
TAArch can be widespread. In other words, although a 
datacentre is used to demonstrate the functionalities of the 
proposed architecture, it is not limited to this scenario. The 
datacentre model represents a very simple datacentre scenario 
where the simulation focuses on the efficiency and 
dependability of resource request and allocation management 
rather than other vast areas of datacentre, e.g., security, 
power, and cooling etc. So the purpose of the experiments is 
to demonstrate the applicability and performance of the 
proposed architecture and not to investigate datacentres 
themselves. However, the datacentre is chosen as 
implementation scenario because its many dimensions of 
complexity and large number of tuning parameters offer a rich 
domain in which to evaluate a wide range of techniques, tools 
and frameworks. 
In this example, detailed experiments are designed to 
analyse three different systems based on three different 
autonomic architectures. The first system, comprising of only 
AC component, is based on the traditional architecture 
represented by level 1 (Figure 3 (i) and (ii)) of the autonomic 
architecture life-cycle. This system will be referred to as 
sysAC. The second system, comprising of both the AC and 
VC components, is based on the current level of practice 
represented by Figure 3 (iii) and (iv). This system will be 
referred to as sysVC. The third and TAArch-based system, 
referred to as sysDC, comprises of all three (AC, VC, and 
DC) components. This system falls within the representation 
of level (v) of Figure 3. The purpose of this implementation is 
to illustrate how powerful and robust the TAArch framework 
is when compared to existing frameworks. 
A. Scheduling and Resource Allocation 
Several research, e.g., [25][26][27], have proposed 
scheduling algorithms that optimise the performance of 
datacentres. In a utility function based approach, Das et al. 
[25] are able to quantify and manage trade-offs between 
competing goals such as performance and energy 
consumption. Their approach reduced datacentre power 
consumption by up to 14%. Other works that have resulted in 
improved performance and resource utilisation by proposing 
new scheduling algorithms include [26], which focuses on the 
allocation of virtual machines in datacentre nodes and [27], 
which uses a ‘greedy resource allocation algorithm’ that 
allows distributing a web workload among different servers 
assigned to each service. Our work, on the other hand, does 
not propose any new scheduling algorithm for efficient 
utilisation of datacentre resources; however, it uses basic 
resource allocation technique to model the performance of 
datacentre autonomic managers in terms of the effectiveness 
of resource request and allocation management. 
Let us consider the model of the datacenter used in this 
experimentation in detail, (in terms of scheduling and request 
services). The datacentre model comprises a pool of resources 
Si (live servers), a pool of shutdown servers Ši (ready to be 
powered and restored to Si as need be), a list of applications 
Aj, a pool of services Ṳ (a combination of applications and 
their provisioning servers), and an autonomic manager 
(performance manager PeM) that optimises the entire system. 
Aj and Si are, respectively, a collection of applications 
supported (as services) by the datacentre and a collection of 
servers available to the manager (PeM) for provisioning (or 
scheduling) available services according to request. As 
service requests arrive, PeM dynamically populates Ṳ to 
service the requests. Ṳ is defined by equation (2): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where Ai: (Si … Sn) means that (Si … Sn) servers are currently 
allocated to Application Ai and n is the number of application 
entries into Ṳ. (2) indicates that a server can be (re)deployed 
for different applications. All the servers i in Si are up and 
running (constantly available –or so desired by PeM) waiting 
for (re)deployment. The primary performance goal of PeM is 
to minimise oscillation and maximise stability (including just-
in-time service delivery to meet service level achievement 
target) while the secondary performance goal is to maximise 
throughput.  
Service (application) requests arrive and are queued. If 
there are enough resources to service a particular request then 
it is serviced otherwise it remains in the queue (or may 
eventually be dropped). The manager checks for resource 
availability and deploys server(s) according to the size of the 
request. The size of application requests and the capacity of 
servers are defined in million instructions per second (MIPS). 
In this report ‘size’ and ‘capacity’ are used interchangeably 
and mostly would refer to MIPS i.e., the extent of its 
processing requirement. When a server is deployed it is 
placed in a queue for a time defined by the variable 
ProvisioningTime. This queue simulates the time (delay) it 
takes to load or configure a server with necessary application. 
Recall from Equation (2) that any server can be (re)configured 
for different applications and so servers are not pre-
configured. Servers are then ‘Provisioned’ after spending 
ProvisioningTime in the queue. The provisioning pool is 
(2) 
       A1: (S11, S12, S13, …, S1i) 
       A2: (S21, S22, S23, …, S2i) 
           …   …    …   …  …  … 
        An: (Sn1, Sn2, Sn3, …, Sni) 
 
Ṳ   = 
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constantly populated as requests arrive. Now as a result of the 
lag between provisioning time and the rate of request arrival 
or as a result of some unforeseen process disruptions, some 
servers do overshoot their provisioning time and thereby left 
redundant in the queue. This can be addressed by the 
manager, depending on configuration, to reduce the impact on 
the whole system. As requests are fully serviced (completed) 
servers are released into the server pool and redeployed. Note 
that service level achievement (SLA) is calculated based on 
accepted requests. Rejected or dropped requests are not 
considered in calculating SLA. The essence of the request 
queue is to allow the manager to accept requests only when it 
has enough resources to service them. Service contract is 
entered only when requests are accepted. So the manager 
could look at its capacity (in terms of available resources), 
compare that with the capacity requested and say ‘sorry I 
haven’t got enough resources’ and reject or drop the request. 
This whole process goes on and the manager manages the 
system to the level of its sophistication. This process is 
explained in Appendix A. 
A basic system without any form of smartness can 
barely go far before the whole system is clogged due to 
inefficient and unstructured resource management. The level 
to which any autonomic manager can successfully and 
efficiently manage the process defined above depends on its 
level of sophistication. For us this largely depends on how 
each manager is wired (in terms of architecture) and not 
necessarily the scheduling algorithm or actual component 
logic used. For example, two managers, differently wired, 
may employ the same scheduling algorithm but achieve 
different results. Results here may be looked at in terms of, 
say, ‘with such level of available resources how many 
requests were successfully serviced’. These are the kind of 
considerations in the following experiments where three 
differently wired autonomic managers are analysed. 
B. Experimental Design, Workload and Parameters 
The experiments are designed and implemented using 
the TAArch application (Appendix A). This application is 
developed using the C# programming language. The scope of 
the experiments focuses on the performance of datacentre 
autonomic managers in resource request and allocation 
management activities under varying workloads. Although 
some workload parameters are sourced from experimental 
results of other research, e.g., [28][29][30], the designed 
experiments allow for the tailoring of all parameters 
according to user preferences. Simulations are designed to 
model several options of real datacentre scenarios. So, 
depending on what is being investigated the user can design 
individual scenarios and set workloads according to specific 
requirements. 
The result of every simulation analysis is relative to the 
set of workload or parameter set used, which configure the 
specific application instance. The parameter set used for the 
datacentre model analysis here are classified into internal and 
external variables. Internal variables are those variables that 
do not change during run-time, e.g., the capacity of a server. 
External variables, on the other hand, are those that can 
change in the cause of the simulation, e.g., the rate at which 
requests arrive. External variables are usually system 
generated and are always unpredictable. The experimental 
design has the capacity for heterogeneous workload 
representation. That means that even the internal variables can 
be reset before simulation begins thereby offering the 
possibility of scaling to high/low load to suit user preferences 
(see Appendix A). The range of value options for most of the 
variables reflects the experimental results of other research 
especially [28][29][30]. Note that the following variables are 
used with the C# application that has been designed to 
simulate the datacentre model and run the stated experiments. 
 
 Internal Variables 
Below is the list of internal variables used in this experiment. 
Some of the variables used are specific to this experiment 
while some are general datacentre variables. 
 
- server.sCapacity: 
This represents the service capacity of each server and for the 
purposes of the experiments here all servers are assumed to be 
of equal capacity. Server capacity (size) is measured in MIPS. 
 
- RetrieveRequestParam: 
Tuning parameter indicating when to start shutting services 
(this simulates service request completion) –at which point 
some running requests are closed as completed. This value is 
measured as percentage of number of servers in use and has 
been restricted to value between 0.1 and 0.3. The margin 0.1 – 
0.3 (representing 10 to 30%) is used because experiments 
show that it is the safest margin within which accurate results 
can be guaranteed. The datacentre is not completely settled 
below 10% and beyond 30% scenarios with low number of 
servers will yield inaccurate results. The higher the value of 
RetrieveRequestParam the earlier the start of request 
completion. 
 
- RetrieveRate: 
Indicates rate at which requests are completed once 
simulation for service request completion is initiated. Value is 
relative to rate of request arrival – e.g., if value is 5, then it 
means service request completion is five times slower than 
rate of service request. 
 
- BurstSize: 
Indicates how long the user wants the burst (injected 
disturbance) to last. This value is measured in milliseconds. 
Burst is a disturbance introduced by the user to cause 
disruption in the system. This alters the smooth running of the 
system and managers react to it differently. Often times 
injecting a burst disorientates the system. The nature of this 
disruption is usually in the form of sudden burst or significant 
shift in the rate of service request. 
 
- ServerProvisioningTime: 
Indicates how long it takes to load or configure a server with 
an application. This is relative to the rate of request arrival -it 
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is measured as half the rate of request arrival, e.g., the value 
of 3 will translate to 1.5 of rate of request arrival. 
 
- ServerOnTime: 
Indicates how long it takes a server to power on. This is 
relative to the rate of request arrival -it is 
ServerProvisioningTime + 1. 
 
- RequestRateParam: 
A constant used to adjust the possible range of request rate. 
The user of the TAArch Application (Appendix A) can set 
request rate according to preference but this preference may 
not be accommodated within the available rate range. For 
example, if the least available rate is 1 request/second and the 
user wishes to use 2 requests/second, the RequestRateParam 
parameter can be used to extend the available range. A higher 
value increases the range for a lower rate of request arrival. 
 
 External Variables 
Below is the list of external variables used in this experiment. 
Recall that external variables, also known as dynamic 
variables, are those variables that are fed into the system 
during run-time either as system generated (dynamic 
sensitivity to contextual changes) or human input (through 
external touch-points). Some of the variables used are specific 
to this experiment while some are general datacentre 
variables. 
 
- DZConst: 
DZConst is the tuning parameter the manager uses to 
dynamically adjust dead-zone boundaries. The dead-zone 
boundary is also known as DZWidth. Because this variable 
has significant effect on the system, it is suggested that the 
initial value be set at 1.5. The manager usually adjusts this 
value dynamically and there is also a provision to manually 
adjust the value during run time. 
 
- AppSize: 
The application size variable represents the size or capacity of 
a service request (request for an application). In the 
experiments that follow, except otherwise changed, all 
applications are initially assumed to be of the same size. 
There are touch-points to dynamically change this value. The 
application size variable is measured in MIPS. 
 
- RequestRate: 
This variable also referred to as rate of service request or rate 
of request arrival is the measure of the frequency of service 
request. This is in terms of the number of requests recorded 
per unit of time. In real systems, this can be calculated as an 
average for all services (applications) or for individual 
services. In [28], for example, RequestRate values are 
calculated for each service and are presented in requests/day. 
The experiments of this work take an average of RequestRate 
for all services and represent values as requests/second. 
 
- BurstInterval: 
The burst interval variable defines the interval at which bursts 
are injected into the system during the simulation. This is 
specific to the experimental application and is dependent on 
what the user wants to investigate. Usually bursts are 
introduced once at a specific time or several at random times. 
 
The experimental workload is flexible in that all 
variables can be scaled to suit user’s workload (high or low) 
requirements. Every experiment has a detailed workload 
outline used as shown in the following experiments. 
C. Manager Logic 
Manager logic details the individual control logic 
employed by each of the managers in order to achieve the 
performance goal. This explains the logical composition of 
each manager. The three autonomic managers track the life-
cycle of autonomic architecture as presented in Figure 3. 
sysAC represents the AutonomicControler level based 
manager while sysVC represents the ValidationCheck level 
based manager. sysDC represents the DependabilityCheck 
level based manager and this conforms to TAArch 
architecture. 
The primary goal of the AM (also referred to as the 
performance manager –PeM), represented by each of sysAC, 
sysVC, and sysDC, is to ensure that the system remains stable 
under almost all perceivable operating and contextual 
circumstances and is capable of achieving desired and 
dependable results within such circumstances (i.e., over the 
expected range of contexts and environmental conditions and 
beyond). The secondary goal is to maximise throughput. 
 
 sysAC 
This manager implements the basic autonomic control 
logic. Structurally based on Figure 3 (ii), the manager receives 
requests and allocates resources accordingly. The basic 
allocation logic here is to deploy a server whenever capacity 
offset (i.e., excess capacity of running servers –these are used 
to service new requests) is less than the current capacity of a 
single request. This is known as the DecisionBoundary. This 
is depicted, for example, as: 
 
if (app1ACOffset < app1.appCapacity) 
{  <...deploy server...>  } 
Where 
app1ACOffset = app1ACAvailableCapacity - 
app1ACRunningCapacity; 
 
sysAC has no additional intelligence. For example, 
decisions are not validated and the manager does not consider 
the rate at which system behaviour crosses the 
DecisionBoundary. As long as boundary conditions are met, 
the manager executes appropriate decisions. 
 
 sysVC 
This manager shows a higher level of intelligence than 
sysAC. One aspect of validation here is to check the 
performance of the manager in terms of correctness. The 
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manager does not start a job that cannot be completed –i.e., at 
every DecisionBoundary the manager checks to make sure 
that it has enough resources to service a request. Where this is 
not the case (meaning the check has failed), the manager 
rejects the request and updates itself. The manager has a limit 
to which it can allow capacity deficit expressed as: 
 
else if (app1VCOffset <= (0 - app1.appCapacity)) 
 { 
     DroppedRequestCountVC += 1; 
 } 
 
So, in addition to the basic control and resource 
allocation logic of sysAC, sysVC carries out a validation of 
every allocation decision. Validation here is in terms of 
behavioural (e.g., starting a job only when there are enough 
capacity to complete it) and structural (e.g., avoiding 
initiating provisioning when server pool is empty i.e., 
listViewServer.Items.Count = 0) correctness. 
sysVC is within the representation of current stages of 
autonomic architecture life-cycle presented in Section II as 
Figure 3 (iii) and (iv). Beyond the level of validation, sysVC 
exhibits no further intelligence. 
 
 sysDC 
sysDC performs all the activities of the sysAC and sysVC 
managers with additional intelligence. The manager looks at 
the balance of cost over longer term and retunes its 
configuration to ensure a balanced performance. For example, 
the manager implements dead-zone (DZ) logic on decision 
boundaries. Firstly, the dead-zone boundaries (upper and 
lower bounds), for example, are calculated as: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: the size of DZ boundary depends on the nature of the 
system and data being processed. For example, in fine-
grained data instance, where small shifts from the target 
can easily tip decisions –sometimes leading to erratic 
behaviour, the DZ boundary is expected to be small and 
closely tracked to the target value. However, in other cases 
as in this experiment, the DZ boundary cannot be as 
closely tracked to the target value. Here the target value 
(DecisionBoundary) is defined by capacity Offset (see (7) 
later) and this is used by the AM to decide whether or not 
to deploy a server. And because Offset is populated in 
serverCapacity and depleted in appCapacity (i.e., 
the difference between available and requested capacity) 
any behaviour shift across the decision boundary (on either 
side of the boundary) is in excess of appCapacity. This 
means that fluctuations around the decision boundary are 
usually in multiples of appCapacity and to handle erratic 
behaviour around DecisionBoundary the AM will need to 
take appCapacity into consideration when calculating 
DZ boundaries. This explains the boundary size calculation 
of (3). Offset is positive when there is excess capacity than 
required and negative when there is a shortfall. Also, 
sample simulation results show that smaller sizes of dead-
zone boundary have no effect on the system behaviour.  
 
Secondly, the zone areas are defined as follows (two 
zones are defined with one on either side of the 
DecisionBoundary –see Figures 8 and 9): 
 
 
if (app1DCOffset < app1.appCapacity) 
{  
App1.SystemBehaviour = "IsInDeployZone";  
} 
else 
{  
App1.SystemBehaviour = "IsNotInDeployZone";  
} 
 
 
Then stability is maintained by persisting the behaviour 
(DecisionBoundary outcome) of the system across the zones 
as follows: 
 
 
if (app1DCOffset >= app1.appCapacity) 
{ App1.SystemBehaviour = "IsNotInDeployZone"; } 
 
if ((App1.SystemBehaviour == "IsInDeployZone") && 
(app1DCOffset < App1.DZUpperBound)) 
{ App1.SystemBehaviour = "IsInDeployZone"; } 
else  
{ App1.SystemBehaviour = "IsNotInDeployZone"; } 
 
if ((App1.SystemBehaviour == "IsNotInDeployZone") && 
(app1DCOffset > App1.DZLowerBound)) 
{ App1.SystemBehaviour = "IsNotInDeployZone"; } 
else  
{ App1.SystemBehaviour = "IsInDeployZone"; } 
 
 
Thus, the DecisionBoundary in sysAC and sysVC, which 
is (app1DCOffset < app1.appCapacity) now becomes 
(App1.SystemBehaviour == "IsInDeployZone") in sysDC. The 
AM dynamically changes the DZ.DZConst value between three 
values of 1, 1.5 and 2. By doing this the manager is sensitive 
to its own behaviour and proactively regulates (retunes) its 
decision pattern to maintain stability and reliability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
App1.DZUpperBound = (app1.appCapacity +   
(app1.appCapacity * DZ.DZConst)); 
 
App1.DZLowerBound = (app1.appCapacity - 
(app1.appCapacity * DZ.DZConst)); 
(3) 
IsInDeployZone 
IsNotInDeployZone 
O
ff
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t 
[m
ip
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DZUpperBound 
DZLowerBound 
DecisionBoundary 
Simulation time 
Figure 6: Dead-zone logic implemented by SysDC. 
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In Figure 6, the area shaded in green represents the 
‘IsInDeployZone’, which means the manager should deploy a 
server while the area shaded in blue represents the 
‘IsNotInDeployZone’, which means the manager should not 
deploy a server. Likewise, the dotted shade pattern represents 
the ‘IsInDeployZone’ while the diagonal shade pattern 
represents the ‘IsNotInDeployZone’. As shown, if, for 
example, the system behaviour falls within the 
‘IsNotInDeployZone’ area, the manager persists the action 
associated to this zone until system behaviour falls below the 
‘DZLowerBound’ boundary at which point the action 
associated to the ‘IsInDeployZone’ area is activated. This way 
the AM is able to maintain reliability and efficiency. The AM 
also retunes its behaviour (as explained earlier) by adjusting 
DZWidth if fluctuation is not reduced to an acceptable level. 
Thus, three behaviour regions (in which different actions are 
activated) are defined; ‘upper region’ (IsNotInDeployZone 
with ‘DO NOT DEPLOY SERVER’ action), ‘lower region’ 
(IsInDeployZone with ‘DEPLOY SERVER’ action), and ‘in DZ’ 
(within the DZWidth with either of the two actions). It is 
important to note, as shown in Figure 6, that within the DZ 
boundary (i.e., the ‘in DZ’ region), either of the actions 
associated to ‘IsInDeployZone’ and ‘IsNotInDeployZone’ 
areas could be maintained depending on the ‘current action’ 
prior to deviation into the ‘in DZ’ region. So actions activated 
in the ‘upper region’ and ‘lower region’ are respectively 
persisted in the ‘in DZ’ region. This is further explained in 
Figure 7, which shows the resultant effect of the DZ logic in 
terms of what zone action is activated per time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 explains what happens in Figure 6. As system 
behaviour fluctuates around decision boundary, the manager 
dynamically adjusts the DZ boundary to mitigate erratic 
adaptation. As shown, minor deviations across the 
DecisionBoundary do not result in decision (or action) 
change. In this case (Figure 7) actions for IsInDeployZone and 
IsNotInDeployZone are persisted at states x and y respectively 
despite system behaviour crossing the decision boundary at 
those state points. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 is a representation of the next level of 
sophistication in autonomic architecture life-cycle required to 
ensure dependability. This is presented in Section II as Figure 
3 (v).  
To illustrate the overall operation of the DZ logic, a 
simple numeric example is given: Let us consider a simple 
use-case example in which a room temperature controller is 
set to maintain temperature at 20
0
C: The AM is configured to 
turn ON heating when room temperature falls below the target 
temperature (20
0
C) and to turn OFF heating otherwise. If, for 
example, the room temperature keeps fluctuating between 
19
0
C and 21
0
C the manager will as well fluctuate with its 
decisions (i.e., erratic behaviour of frequently turning heating 
ON and OFF). This situation is undesirable and can be 
enormously costly in crucial systems. To mitigate this 
situation, the manager can implement DZ logic with a 
DZLowerBound of 19
0
C and DZUpperBound of 21
0
C. This 
will allow the manager to turn off heating only when room the 
temperature rises above 21
0
C and to turn on heating only 
when it falls below 19
0
C. Putting this in the context of (20) 
means that, e.g.:  
 
DZUpperBound = (20 + (20 * 0.05)) 
DZLowerBound = (20 – (20 * 0.05)) 
 
This will calm the erratic behaviour of the AM. 
However, if the erratic behaviour does not drop to an 
acceptable level the manager can further retune itself by 
increasing DZConst by multiples of 0.05 (e.g., DZConst += 
0.05). If on the other hand the AM discovers that it is not 
making decisions frequently enough, (i.e., the room is getting 
too cold or too hot) it can retune its behaviour to increase its 
rate of decision-making by reducing the DZ boundaries (e.g., 
DZConst –= 0.05). So the AM retunes itself by dynamically 
adjusting the DZ boundaries using (DZConst  = 0.05) as 
appropriate. It is important to note that the average of the DZ 
boundaries is equal to the target goal – e.g., the average of 
19
0
C and 21
0
C is 20
0
C, which is the target temperature. 
D. Simulation Scenarios and Metrics 
In the following simulations to analyse the performances 
of the three systems (sysAC, sysVC and sysDC), four 
simulation scenarios are used. The scenarios are presented in 
Table I. The user of the TAArch application can define further 
scenarios as required. 
 
Table I: Resource allocation simulation scenarios 
Scenario Description Metrics 
Scenario 1 Basic simulation with uniform 
request rate and application size 
 
 
SLA 
Delay cost 
Server deployment rate 
Optimum provisioning 
(Offset analysis) 
Scenario 2 Basic simulation with uniform 
request rate and varying 
application sizes 
Scenario 3 Uniform application size with 
burst injected at a particular 
time in the simulation  
Scenario 4 Varying application sizes with 
inconsistent request rate 
 
Simulation time 
O
ff
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t 
[m
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DZBoundary  
(Dynamic) 
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System Behaviour 
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y 
Figure 7: Illustration explaining actual performance effect of DZ logic. 
S AC D
C 
DC A VC 
Figure 8: Structural representation of sysDC. 
290
International Journal on Advances in Intelligent Systems, vol 7 no 1 & 2, year 2014, http://www.iariajournals.org/intelligent_systems/
2014, © Copyright by authors, Published under agreement with IARIA - www.iaria.org
Scenario 1: In scenario 1, all parameters are kept constant 
except those (e.g., DZConst) that may need dynamic tuning 
by the manager as need arises. This scenario gives a default 
view of the behaviour of the managers under normal 
condition. Under this scenario of normal condition, it is 
expected that all managers will behave significantly closely. 
  
Scenario 2: This scenario creates a condition where the 
managers will have to deal with irregular sizes of service 
request. This leads to contention between applications –huge 
applications will demand huge resources thereby starving 
smaller applications. Performance analysis here will include 
individual application analysis. Request rate is kept constant 
so that the effect of varying application sizes could be better 
analysed. 
 
Scenario 3: In this scenario, request rate and application size 
are kept constant while burst is injected at a chosen time 
(SimulationTime) in the simulation. This is similar to Scenario 
1 just that a sudden and unexpected disruption (burst) is 
injected into the system. This will measure the robustness of 
the AMs in adhering to the goal of the system. The impact of 
the burst is relative to the size of the burst (BurstSize). 
 
Scenario 4: This is the most complex scenario with resource 
contention and two instances of burst injection. This scenario 
creates the combined effect of Scenarios 2 and 3 put together. 
Request sizes vary leading to resource contention and request 
rate is highly erratic. Inconsistent request rate can also lead to 
‘flooding’, which also is a kind of burst. Flooding is a 
situation where the system is inundated with requests at 
disproportionate rate. 
 
All metrics are mathematically defined giving the reader 
a clear picture of the definition criteria should they wish to 
replicate this experiment.  
 
SLA: Service level achievement is the ratio of provided 
service to requested service. It measures the system’s level of 
success in meeting request needs. Note that requests and 
services are not time bound so the time it takes to complete a 
request does not count in this regard. The metric is defined as: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where ProvisionedCapacity is the total deployed server 
capacity (excluding those in queue and including those 
already reclaimed back to the pool) and RequestedCapacity is 
the total size of request (including completed requests). 
AvailableCapacity is ProvisionedCapacity minus capacity of 
reclaimed servers (ReclaimedCapacity) while 
RunningCapacity is the total size of request (excluding 
completed requests). In (4), (i) is more of a whole picture 
consideration –considering the entire capacity activities of the 
system while (ii) takes a real time view of the system –
tracking to the minute details of the system with delay, 
completed requests and reclaimed server effects all 
considered. The reference value for SLA is 1 indicating 
100%. Values above 1 indicate over-provisioning while 
values under 1 indicate shortfall. Optimum provisioning is 
achieved at close proximity to 1. 
 
Delay cost: Delay cost can be calculated in many different 
ways as the cost can be influenced by many delay 
contributors. In this instance, delay cost is defined as the cost 
(in capacity) as a result of the delay experienced by the 
servers. This delay affects the completion time of service 
requests. This is mathematically represented as: 
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ProvisioningCapacity is the capacity of servers in queue 
while DeployedCapacity is the total capacity of all deployed 
servers. The lower value of delay cost means the better 
performance of the system. 
 
Deployment Rate: Server (re)deployment rate is the ratio of 
server deployment to service request. It measures the 
frequency at which managers deploy servers with regards to 
the nature of requests. This is mathematically represented as: 
 
               = 
                
(                                   )
       (6) 
 
The lower value of deployment rate means the better 
performance of the system translating to better maximisation 
of throughput. 
 
Optimum provisioning: This metric is also an offset 
analysis. It indicates whether and when the manager is over or 
under provisioning. This is also known as efficiency 
calculation. Offset is calculated as: 
 
                                              (7) 
 
Under normal circumstances, average offset is not expected to 
fall below zero. The system is optimally provisioning when 
offset falls between zero and the average capacity of all 
applications. The closer to zero the offset value is, the better 
the performance of the system.  
 
Note that, for all metrics, low or high values do not always 
necessarily translate to better performance. It is not usually 
realistic for the supposed better manager to always 
outperform the other managers. There are times when the 
manager underperforms and usually there may be a tradeoff of 
some kind that explains the situation. 
(4) 
         𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
     (i) 
 
      𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
       (ii) 
SLA   = 
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E. Experimental Results 
Results are presented and analysed according to 
simulation scenarios. For precise results, ten different 
simulations of each Scenario are performed and results 
presented are based on average of these ten simulations. For 
each of the ten simulations, the parameters used are presented. 
It is important to note the workload and parameters used for 
individual simulations as results will largely depend on those. 
 
Scenario 1: Basic simulation with uniform request rate 
and application size 
 
Table II is a collection of major parameters used in this 
scenario. The number of requests and the distribution of those 
requests amongst applications differ with each AM as they are 
dynamically generated and unpredictable. This does not 
distort the results as analysis is based on system-wide 
performance and not on individual application performance. 
 
Table II: Scenario 1 simulation parameters 
Parameter Value 
# of servers 300 
# of applications 4 
Request rate 1 req/sec 
Application capacity (MIPS) 20000 
Server capacity (MIPS) 40000 
 
Internal 
variables 
RetrieveRate 5x 
RequestRateParam 10 
RetrieveRequestParam 0.2 
ServerProvisioningTime 3 (1.5 sec) 
Managers  (sysAC, sysVC & sysDC) PeM 
DZConst 1.5 
 
In every simulation, there are 300 servers of 40000 
MIPS capacity each. This means there is a total of initial 
12000000 MIPS to share between requests for four 
applications (App1, App2, App3, and App4). Reclaimed 
servers are later added to this available capacity. If the total 
requested capacity is higher than the total provisioned 
capacity, the unused server list will be empty (leaving the 
manager with a deficit of outstanding requests without 
resources to service them) and the datacentre is overloaded. 
So the simulation stops whenever any manager runs out of 
resources (i.e., when the unused server list of any manager 
becomes empty). It is necessary to stop the simulation at this 
point because as soon as the unused server list of a particular 
manager becomes empty, the RequestedCapacity for that 
manager starts piling up while AvailableCapacity remains at 
zero, which leads to continuously increasing negative Offset. 
This will lead to inaccurate assessment of the three managers 
(recall that all three managers are compared concurrently and 
it is safer to do this while all three managers are active). Also, 
at this point, usually, other managers may have outstanding 
resources and this will mean better efficiency. Table III is a 
number distribution of requests and services for ten 
simulation runs of Scenario 1. The values shown are collected 
at the end of each simulation, for example, it can be seen that 
the manager of sysAC has no servers left in each of the 
simulations while sysVC has a couple and sysDC even more. 
Though sysAC and sysVC are able to service almost the same 
number of requests, sysVC has outstanding server capacity 
and could service more requests. However, the additional 
smartness of sysVC does not always translate to better 
performance as highlighted in Table III (this is an example of 
manager interference leading to overcompensation). sysDC 
clearly outperformed the others with an average of about 36 
outstanding servers out of 300 initial servers. Figures 11-14 
give a breakdown of the performances. 
 
Table III: High level performance analysis of managers over ten 
simulation runs of Scenario 1 
  
The difference between requested capacity and 
provisioned capacity (or in real time analysis, running 
capacity and available capacity) is known as Offset. Where 
offset is close to zero, the difference with respect to running 
and available MIPS is low and the AM is therefore very 
efficient. When offset is much greater than or much less than 
zero, the AM is over-provisioning or under-provisioning 
respectively and is very inefficient. The AMs are designed to 
have a window of ‘optimum provisioning’ defined by the 
interval (0 ≤ Offset ≤ AvgAppCapacity), which means that 
the AM are configured to maintain AvailableCapacity of up to 
average appCapacity for just-in-time provisioning. However, 
AM efficiency is defined by its ability to maintain Offset as 
close as possible to zero. Figure 9 shows the efficiency 
analysis of the three managers in terms of maximising 
resources. This is in terms average performances of the three 
AMs over ten simulation runs. This means that the same 
scenario was run for ten times and then the average result was 
calculated. This gives a clearer picture and more accurate 
analysis of manager performance.  
 
 
Figure 9: Manager efficiency analysis for scenario 1. 
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Sim unused server serviced request deployed server 
 AC VC DC AC VC DC AC VC DC 
1 0 2 35 578 577 555 307 307 268 
2 0 3 27 594 594 574 310 299 278 
3 0 0 36 600 590 574 309 305 268 
4 0 0 34 593 585 566 309 313 274 
5 0 0 30 609 586 587 312 303 273 
6 0 0 38 597 586 576 308 309 268 
7 0 0 36 613 605 587 314 304 268 
8 0 15 39 591 590 565 307 287 263 
9 0 6 33 582 582 566 304 302 271 
10 0 8 48 569 567 542 310 298 255 
avg 0 3.4 35.6 592.6 586.2 569.2 309 302.7 268.6 
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Figure 9 shows that, in terms of efficiency, sysAC 
performed significantly similar to sysVC with a couple of 
instances where sysAC also performed better than sysVC. This 
is as a result of over compensation introduced by the extra 
level of smartness in sysVC. The validation check of sysVC 
gives it an advantage over sysAC but it sometimes leads to 
over compensation. For example, though sysVC checks to 
ensure resource availability against resource requests, it is not 
adequately sensitive to erratic request fluctuation. High level 
of erratic request fluctuation disorientates sysVC (as can be 
seen in later scenarios where burst is injected) but this effect 
is naturally and dynamically handled by sysDC. sysDC takes a 
longer term look at the self-management effect on the 
datacentre and retunes its self-management behaviour. The 
rate at which the managers change decision, (which can 
indicate erratic behaviour) is indicated by the gap between the 
crests and troughs of the graph in Figure 9. Smaller gap 
indicates erratic change of decision while bigger gap indicates 
more persisted decision. As seen, sysDC has significantly 
more persisted decisions and this allows it to more adequately 
track resource availability against resource requests, which 
leads to more efficient performance as can be seen. Recall that 
optimum provisioning is defined by the (0 ≤ Offset ≤ 
AvgAppCapacity) interval, which in this case is between 0 
and 20000 MIPS. sysDC clearly falls within this range, 
though a bit towards the 20000 border. This means that while 
sysAC and sysVC try to maintain AvailableCapacity of up to 
20000 MIPS for just-in-time provisioning, sysDC efficiently 
depletes this reserve to maximise resources while at the same 
time maintaining the same level of performance and even 
better compared to the other two. This is evidently seen in the 
following deployment rate, SLA, and cost metrics analyses. 
 
 
Figure 10: Server deployment rate analysis for scenario 1. 
 
Figure 10 shows the rate at which the three AMs deploy 
servers as requests arrive. With the same request rate, the 
AMs deployed servers differently. While sysAC deployed the 
most servers, sysDC deployed the least servers. This explains 
why sysAC easily runs out of servers followed by sysVC while 
sysDC still retains a couple of unused servers (Table III). 
Interestingly, this does not negatively affect the performance 
of sysDC and when sysDC underperforms in one aspect there 
is usually compensation (say tradeoff) in another aspect. The 
lower server deployment rate of sysDC resulted in lower SLA 
value of sysDC (when compared to sysAC and sysVC –Figure 
11) but this only keeps the value very close to the optimum 
value of 1, which also indicates high efficiency. 
Figure 11 depicts the service levels of the three AMs 
with the zoomed-in inset revealing the gaps between their 
performances. As expected, following from the result trend 
above, sysAC and sysVC performed quite similarly with each 
outperforming the other in some places. sysDC on the other 
hand, keeps SLA as close as possible to the target goal of 1 (a 
perfect system would keep SLA at 1). sysDC has the ability to 
dynamically scale down unnecessary and inefficient 
provisioning by proactively throttling oscillation. This 
capability also leads to cost savings as shown in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 11: Service level achievement (SLA) analysis for scenario 1. 
 
 
Figure 12: Delay cost analysis for Scenario 1. 
 
The high level of deployment rate (i.e., deploying more 
MIPS than required) for sysAC and sysVC (Figure 10) leads to 
high cost (in terms of excess MIPS) of servicing individual 
requests. Also this means that the rate at which servers enter 
the provisioning queue is much higher than the rate they leave 
the queue. This results in an increasing number of redundant 
servers in the queue, which contributes to delay cost (Figure 
12). Also, the number of redundant servers for sysDC is 
doubled by that of sysAC and sysVC. 
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The results analyses of Scenario 1 indicate that the 
proposed TAArch (represented by sysDC) has significant 
performance improvement over existing architectures. This 
assertion is further tested in the following scenarios. 
 
Scenario 2: Basic simulation with uniform request rate 
and varying application sizes 
 
Table IV is a collection of the major parameters used in 
this scenario.  
 
Table IV: Scenario 2 simulation parameters 
Parameter Value 
# of servers 300 
# of applications 2 
 
App capacity (MIPS) 
App1 30000 
App2 5000 
Request rate 1 req/sec 
Server capacity (MIPS) 40000 
 
Internal 
variables 
RetrieveRate 5x 
RequestRateParam 10 
RetrieveRequestParam 0.2 
ServerProvisioningTime 3 (1.5 sec) 
Managers  (sysAC, sysVC & sysDC) PeM 
DZConst 1.5 
 
In this scenario, there are 300 servers of 40000 capacity 
each to be shared amongst two applications (App1 and App2). 
This means there is a total of initial 12000000 MIPS to share 
between requests for App1 with 30000 MIPS and App2 with 
5000 MIPS. The capacity gap between the two applications is 
so wide that it may naturally lead to contention with App1 
demanding more resources than App2. In this kind of 
situation where it is easy to underserve one application 
because of the contention, it is left for the datacentre 
autonomic managers to decide how best to efficiently allocate 
resources. Results show that while sysAC maintained a 
proportionate resource allocation (in terms of applications) for 
the two applications, sysVC and sysDC prioritised 
provisioning for App1 with much higher MIPS request. One 
disadvantage of proportionate provisioning is that it treats 
requests according to applications (in this case two 
applications) and not according to capacity (in this case 30000 
versus 5000). When this happens, the high capacity 
application (App1) will be heavily under-provisioned while 
the low capacity application (App2) will be adequately 
provisioned (and sometimes over-provisioned) compared to 
the level of provisioning for App1 as shown in Figure 14 (a) 
for sysAC Offset analysis. Also this amounts to inefficiency 
and explains why sysAC easily exhausts its resources as 
shown in Table V. Table V shows the results of requests 
distribution amongst the three managers. 
The ‘dropped/queued request’ analysis shows that in 
prioritising App1, sysVC and sysDC dropped more of App2 
requests while sysAC, which does not drop any application, 
struggled to cope with the capacity imbalance. For a clearer 
picture Figure 13 shows how sysVC and sysDC prioritised 
App1 over App2. 
 
Table V: High level performance analysis of managers over ten 
simulation runs of Scenario 2 
  
Sim. 
unused server serviced request deployed server 
AC VC DC AC VC DC AC VC DC 
1 0 118 127 423 242 231 399 227 207 
2 0 113 125 465 263 251 422 233 213 
3 0 132 145 450 234 225 418 211 191 
4 0 120 113 447 248 254 411 211 223 
5 0 124 122 440 246 243 405 218 218 
6 0 100 120 451 259 250 413 237 221 
7 0 108 127 470 265 253 420 239 208 
8 0 96 114 434 262 258 404 236 228 
9 0 102 116 458 261 257 413 241 222 
10 0 107 112 428 250 249 394 225 219 
avg 0 112 122.1 446.6 253 247.1 409.9 227.8 215 
 
As can be seen in Figure 13, there is a consistent trend of 
high rate of dropped App2 requests. This means that more 
resources were allocated to App1 and thereby starving App2. 
As this continued, it led to more App2 being dropped as there 
were limited resources per time to service App2 requests. 
Also noticeable is the smoothness of provisioning for App1 
compared to the bumpiness of provisioning for App2 –this is 
further explained in the Offset analysis that follows. 
 
 
Figure 13: Dropped/queued request analysis for Scenario 2. 
 
sysAC on the other hand did not drop any request and 
trying to evenly joggle resources between the highly 
imbalanced MIPS requests for the two applications meant that 
more resources per time than necessary are used. This 
explains why sysAC exhausted its resources quite early in the 
simulation while the other managers have hundreds of servers 
still unused (Table V). Figure 14 (a) shows that while App2 is 
about adequately provisioned, App1 is heavily under-
provisioned. This is because sysAC evenly provisioned for the 
two applications thereby starving App1, which has very high 
MIPS requests. So by accepting all requests despite low 
resource availability sysAC under-provisioned for App1 far 
more than it did for App2 because of the large size of App1 
requests. There is no check in sysAC to ensure resource 
availability before requests are accepted. 
In Figure 14, App2 offset is maintained at (0 ≥ -18000 
MIPS) by sysAC, (-1666 ≥ -5000 MIPS) by sysVC and (0 ≥ -
5000 MIPS) by sysDC. Also, App1 offset ranges between 
(50000 and -139000 MIPS) for sysAC, (60000 and -30000 
MIPS) for sysVC and (30000 and -30000 MIPS) for sysDC. 
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This shows that while sysAC treats requests according to 
applications (i.e., by trying to evenly provision for both 
applications), sysVC and sysDC are sensitive to the individual 
size of requests. As a result, by taking on all requests and 
attempting an even distribution of resources for both 
applications, sysAC heavily under-provisions for App1 and 
this also affected its performance for App2. sysVC and sysDC 
on the other hand, maintained more balanced resource 
allocation for both applications in terms of request capacity 
with sysDC showing higher efficiency than sysVC. Note that a 
positive Offset above the optimal provisioning mark amounts 
to over-provisioning while a negative Offset amounts to 
under-provisioning. Recall that optimal provisioning mark is 
defined by the interval (0 ≤ Offset ≤ AvgAppCapacity), 
which in this case is (0 ≤ Offset ≤ ((30000 + 5000)/2)) –that 
is, between 0 and 17500 MIPS.  
 
 
(a) sysAC Offset analysis for App1 and App2. App2 is about adequately 
provisioned (i.e., Offset ≈ 0) while App1 is heavily under-provisioned 
 
 
(b) sysVC Offset analysis for App1 and App2. App2 is about adequately 
provisioned while App1 over-provisioned (well above the optimal 
provisioning mark, which is defined by 0 ≤ Offset ≤ AvgAppCapacity) 
 
 
(c) sysDC Offset analysis for App1 and App2. App2 is about adequately 
provisioned while App1 is slightly over-provisioned (slightly above the 
optimal provisioning mark, which is defined by 0 ≤ Offset ≤ 
AvgAppCapacity) 
 
Figure 14: Individual Offset analysis for scenario 2. 
Figure 15 shows the average manager efficiency analysis 
for all three systems. On the average sysAC did not stand up 
to the complex provisioning condition of Scenario 2 as did the 
other systems. Figure 15 shows that sysAC could not 
efficiently cope with the level of resource contention 
experienced between App1 and App2. sysVC and sysDC show 
almost the same level of autonomic sophistication however, 
sysDC is shown to be more efficient. Although both systems 
have the same least under-provisioning value of -17500 
MIPS, sysVC recorded a maximum over-provisioning value of 
27500 MIPS (well above the optimal provisioning mark of 
17500) while sysDC recorded a maximum positive Offset 
value of 13500 MIPS (below the optimal provisioning mark). 
This indicates that sysDC is efficiently more sophisticated in 
handling complex resource allocation scenario that would 
ordinarily prove difficult for traditional autonomic managers 
(sysAC and sysVC) to handle. E.g., this increased efficiency 
arises from the fact that the DependabilityCheck sub-
component of sysDC enables it to go beyond dropping 
requests if there are insufficient resources to deploying 
resources only when it is necessary and efficient to do so.  
 
 
 
Figure 15: Manager efficiency analysis for scenario 2. 
 
 
The results analysis of Scenario 2 is a further 
corroboration of the assertion that the TAArch architecture 
(represented by sysDC) has significant performance 
improvement over existing architectures. There are two more 
simulation scenarios to further test this assertion. 
 
Scenario 3: Uniform application size with burst injected at 
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In this scenario, request rate and application size are kept 
constant while burst is injected at a particular time (200s) in 
the simulation. This is similar to Scenario 1 just that a sudden 
and unexpected disruption is injected into the system. This 
simulation will measure the robustness of the AMs in 
adhering to the goal of the system. Another important factor 
to look at is how long it takes the AMs to recover from the 
disruption caused by the burst. The impact of the burst is 
relative to the size of the burst, (which in this case is 2500 
ms). Table VI is a collection of major parameters used. 
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Table VI: Scenario 3 simulation parameters 
Parameter Value 
# of servers 300 
# of applications 4 
Request rate 1 req/sec 
Application capacity (MIPS) 20000 
Server capacity (MIPS) 40000 
 
Internal 
variables 
RetrieveRate 5x 
RequestRateParam 10 
RetrieveRequestParam 0.2 
BurstSize 2500ms 
ServerProvisioningTime 3 (1.5 sec) 
Managers  (sysAC, sysVC & sysDC) PeM 
DZConst 1.5 
  
In every simulation, there are 300 servers of 40000 
MIPS each. This means there is a total of initial 12000000 
MIPS to share between four applications (App1, App2, App3, 
and App4). Reclaimed servers are subsequently added to this 
available capacity. The managers receive requests and 
allocate resources accordingly as long as AvailableCapacity is 
not zero. The reliability of a manager will be measured by its 
ability to remain efficient under almost all perceivable 
operating circumstances. Table VII is a number-distribution 
of requests and services for ten simulation runs of Scenario 3. 
 
Table VII: High level performance analysis of managers over ten 
simulation runs of Scenario 3 
 unused server serviced request deployed server 
AC VC DC AC VC DC AC VC DC 
1 0 68 89 453 417 407 306 240 211 
2 0 55 74 564 431 418 309 253 230 
3 0 61 90 467 430 415 309 248 216 
4 0 63 86 481 439 423 307 242 220 
5 0 59 79 482 447 431 312 255 232 
6 0 57 87 462 426 412 304 246 214 
7 0 69 93 444 408 391 307 235 219 
8 0 67 94 455 420 404 302 238 209 
9 0 63 95 463 424 408 305 248 213 
10 0 58 80 453 420 410 304 247 226 
avg 0 62 86.7 472.4 426.2 411.9 306.5 245.2 219 
 
On the average, from Table VII, sysAC had initiated 
about 46.2 requests (924000 MIPS) more than sysVC and 
about 60.5 requests (1210000 MIPS) more than sysDC but has 
no extra capacity left to proceed beyond this point. However, 
sysVC and sysDC both have about 2480000 MIPS and 
3468000 MIPS extra capacity respectively. This means that, 
under normal circumstances, both systems (sysVC and sysDC) 
could conveniently provision for about additional 124 and 
173.4 requests respectively. Clearly, sysDC is seen to have 
outperformed the other systems. This is principally because 
the dead-zone logic of sysDC helps it to significantly reduce 
the number of activated decision boundaries. This means that 
decisions are not erratically taken, which leads to high 
efficiency and reliability. Figures 17 – 20 give a breakdown 
of the performances. 
Figure 16 shows how all three managers reacted to the 
disruption injected at 200s. While sysVC and sysDC were able 
to recover after about 9s each (with sysDC a bit less than 
that), it took sysAC about 90s to recover. We can also see that 
sysDC reasonably maintained provisioning within the optimal 
provisioning mark, which in this case is between 0 and 20000 
MIPS. There is also a noticeable trend that suggests an extra 
level of autonomic sophistication in sysDC which is also a 
sign of reliability. Notice that within pre disruption and post 
disruption recovery both sysAC and sysVC maintained their 
level of performances (which nonetheless is averagely about 
5000 MIPS above the optimal provisioning mark) while 
sysDC, within the same time frame, switched between two 
levels of performance as shown by the solid black line. This is 
the effect of dynamic (re)tuning of the DZWidth by sysDC. 
This capability enables sysDC to systematically track the 
system’s goal (in this case maintaining reliability and 
efficiency within the optimal provisioning mark) by 
dynamically retuning its decision boundary. As shown in 
Figure 16, before the disruption sysDC maintained a steady 
and continuous level of efficiency by keeping DZConst at 1.5 
but as soon as the disruption sets in it quickly retunes itself 
and reduced the DZConst to 1. At this point the manager 
stopped accepting further requests (as the datacentre is now 
receiving torrential streams of requests) but the initial shock 
(caused by the lag between when the disruption started and 
when the manager shuts its door) meant that a few resources 
were released to mitigate the effect of the situation. This will 
instantly start pushing up Offset until the datacentre 
normalises and then as shown sysDC retunes its decision 
boundary by returning DZConst back to 1.5. So while sysAC 
is heavily affected by a disruption of this magnitude and 
sysVC shows a remarkable level of robustness, sysDC shows a 
longer term ability to sensitively throttle its behaviour to 
efficiently and reliably track the goal of the entire system. 
 
 
Figure 16: Manager efficiency analysis for scenario 3. The black solid line 
indicates sysDC’s dynamic tuning of dead-zone boundary. The manager 
started with a DZConst of 1.5 (left lower part of the line) then changed to 
DZConst of 1 (high part) and then back to DZConst of 1.5. 
 
Figure 17 shows that while sysVC and sysDC responded 
to the disruption by rejecting requests as soon as they were 
overwhelmed thereby pushing down their server deployment 
rate, sysAC responded by deploying even more servers to 
meet the current service demand. Despite deploying more 
servers sysAC still could not meet up with demand rate, which 
ultimately affected its SLA achievement (Figure 18). This is 
because the provisioning rate, (which is dependent on 
ProvioningTime) could not keep up with the rate at which 
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servers are deployed. As a result sysAC had more servers 
(almost tripling that of sysDC) overshooting their 
ProvisioningTime thereby getting redundant and pushing up 
delay cost as well. 
 
 
Figure 17: Server deployment rate analysis for scenario 3. 
 As the datacentre settles (after the disruption) sysAC 
starts normalising the rate of server deployment but because 
there is already a huge backlog of requests (about 173000 
MIPS as in Figure 16) it takes sysAC a long time to recover. 
This also contributes to why it quickly exhausts its resources. 
sysVC and sysDC on the other hand, with a small backlog of 
about 7500 MIPS, need not deploy more resources than the 
ordinary (Figure 17) but gradually absolves the backlog 
allowing them to quickly recover. 
 
 
Figure 18: Service level achievement (SLA) analysis for scenario 3. 
High level of deployment rate (inefficient deployment of 
more MIPS than necessary) also leads to high cost (in terms 
of excess MIPS) of servicing individual requests. This means 
that the rate at which servers enter the provisioning queue is 
much higher than the rate they leave the queue. The rate for 
sysAC almost doubles that of sysVC and almost triples that of 
sysDC. This leads to increasing number of redundant servers 
in the queue, which contributes to delay cost. 
The results analysis of Scenario 3 shows that it is 
absolutely inefficient and unreliable to run a datacentre with a 
manager based on sysAC. While sysVC based AMs are more 
robust, their robustness is limited in terms of the extent of 
sensitivity to system’s goal under unfamiliar circumstances in 
which sysDC based AMs are more sophisticated and 
dynamically reliable. This further corroborates the assertion 
that the TAArch architecture (sysDC) has significant 
performance improvement over existing architectures. 
 
Scenario 4:  Varying application sizes with inconsistent 
request rate 
 
This is the most complex scenario with a combined 
effect of Scenarios 2 and 3 put together. The complexity 
presented by this scenario (i.e., a combined effect of resource 
contention and two injected disruptions) allows us to further 
test the robustness of these systems by stretching their 
capabilities to extremes. Table VIII is a collection of the 
major parameters used in this scenario. As in previous 
scenarios, results presented are based on average of ten 
different simulation runs. 
 
Table VIII: Scenario 4 simulation parameters 
Parameter Value 
# of servers 400 
# of applications 2 
 
App capacity (MIPS) 
App1 30000 
App2 15000 
Request rate (initial) 1 req/sec 
Server capacity (MIPS) 40000 
 
Internal 
variables 
RetrieveRate 5x 
RequestRateParam 10 
RetrieveRequestParam 0.2 
BurstSize 1500ms 
ServerProvisioningTime 3 (1.5 sec) 
Managers  (sysAC, sysVC & sysDC) PeM 
DZConst (initial) 1.5 
 
In every simulation of this scenario, there are 400 
servers of 40000 MIPS each to be shared amongst two 
applications (App1 and App2). This means there is a total of 
initial 16000000 MIPS to share between requests for App1 
with 30000 MIPS and App2 with 15000 MIPS. Table IX is a 
number distribution of requests and services for ten 
simulation runs of Scenario 4. 
 
Table IX: High level performance analysis of managers over ten 
simulation runs of Scenario 4 
  unused server serviced request deployed server 
AC VC DC AC VC DC AC VC DC 
1 0 109 120 474 395 394 435 339 316 
2 0 124 133 465 387 382 433 325 303 
3 0 123 125 471 400 397 443 330 314 
4 0 112 114 473 395 400 439 343 321 
5 0 114 130 476 398 402 440 335 304 
6 0 118 124 473 393 398 439 331 308 
7 0 115 117 468 393 394 437 336 320 
8 0 113 122 468 398 396 435 330 307 
9 0 113 116 476 395 401 444 342 322 
10 0 110 115 476 398 394 446 337 323 
avg 0 115 122 472 395 393 439 335 314 
 
Results reveal that sysAC is not adequately robust in 
such complex situations as in Scenario 4. The system is 
heavily inefficient in handling this type of situation (Figure 19 
(a)). Its algorithm, which maintains proportionate 
provisioning with respect to number of applications as against 
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capacity of requests, was disorientated by the level of 
contention and disruption experienced.  
As shown in Figure 19 the first burst was injected at 
100s while the second was injected at 250s. sysAC is limited 
in its ability to handle complex situations and so cannot be 
relied upon to operate large scale and complex datacentres. 
sysVC and sysDC both have a wide range of operability in 
complex situations. However, a closer look at sysVC and 
sysDC in this scenario reveals a unique change in expected (as 
observed in previous results) trend. The highlighted bits of 
Table IX show that sysDC dropped fewer requests than sysVC 
and thereby initiating more requests. Under normal 
circumstances, as observed in previous scenarios, sysVC 
usually would drop fewer requests than sysDC. In this 
situation the level of disturbance (as a result of resource 
contention and erratic request disorder) in the datacentre led 
to instability in sysVC, which caused it to over react by 
inefficiently dropping requests. This instability reveals a 
weakness in design because in real-life datacentres such 
disturbances (like sudden request spikes) do occur and 
managers are expected to adequately stabilise the entire 
system under such circumstances. sysDC on the other hand, 
with the capability of a longer term view of the entire system, 
was able to take on more requests. 
 
 
(a) Manager efficiency analysis of all three systems 
 
(b) Manager efficiency analysis for sysVC and sysDC. 
Figure 19: Manager efficiency analysis for Scenario 4. Bursts affect 
all managers at 100s and 250s time frames 
 
However, this achievement is with associated tradeoff in 
delay cost (Figure 20). This shows that sysDC is more 
sensitive to the relationship between requested MIPS and 
available MIPS. For example, in a situation where sysVC 
dropped a number of requests following a fixed decision 
boundary (when there is lack of immediate available 
resources to handle incoming requests), sysDC used a 
dynamic decision boundary to accommodate more requests 
allowing it to efficiently use up its available resources. By 
taking on more requests, sysDC trades off delay cost, which is 
not so much of importance but at the same time improves 
scheduling efficiency, which is of more importance. 
Interestingly, the efficiency level is not affected –Figure 19 
(b) shows that there is no significant difference in efficiency 
performance of both sysVC and sysDC. So what we have is a 
situation where, on the average, sysDC utilised significantly 
fewer resources (313.8 : 334.8 servers) to serve slightly 
higher amount of requests (395.8 : 395.2 requests) as sysVC 
(Table IX) resulting in improved efficiency (Figure 19 (b)) for 
sysDC and approximately same level of SLA (Figure 21) and 
delay cost (Figure 20) achievement for both sysVC and 
sysDC. 
 
 
Figure 20: Cost analysis for Scenario 4. 
 
There is consistent corroboration of the fact that sysAC 
is limited in the range of its operational scope when it comes 
to complex situations. Scenario 4 results show that it is highly 
expensive, inefficient and unreliable to operate complex 
datacentres with autonomic managers based on sysAC. 
However, sysAC based managers may suffice for simple and 
basic datacentres. On the other hand, sysDC has shown 
consistent reliability in all tested scenarios. The level of 
robustness exhibited in this scenario by sysDC is a clear 
indication that it is not a hard-wired one-directional self-
managing system. For example, in this scenario we have seen 
that sysDC does not only act when sysVC is taking more 
actions than necessary but also when it is taking fewer actions 
than necessary. So it can be said that sysDC is capable of 
reducing inefficient adaptation (e.g., when sysVC’s decisions 
are erratic) as well as increasing adaptation when it is 
necessary and efficient to (e.g., when sysVC is not making 
decisions frequently enough). This capability of increased 
adaptation is shown in Table IX and illustrated in Figures 20 
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to 22 –sysDC is able to maximise resources while achieving 
the same level of performance as sysVC. 
 
 
Figure 21: Service level achievement (SLA) analysis for scenario 4. 
 
From the results of the four experimental scenarios 
presented above we can conclude that sysAC has a narrow 
envelope of operational conditions in which it is both self-
managing and returns satisfactory behaviour. On the other 
hand, sysVC tends towards a wider operational envelope with 
increased efficiency and satisfactory behaviour, but once the 
limits of that envelope are reached the efficiency and 
reliability of the system drops. In moderate operational 
complexities sysVC performs adequately efficient but 
fluctuates rapidly and may need human input to override 
some decisions that lead to instability in the case of highly 
erratic and complex situation, which for example sysDC can 
deal with autonomically. Results have shown that sysDC is 
sufficiently sophisticated to operate efficiently and yield 
satisfactory results under almost all perceivable operating 
circumstances. So we can now confidently conclude that the 
proposed trustworthy autonomic architecture (represented by 
sysDC) has significant performance improvement over 
existing architectures and can be relied upon to operate (or 
manage) almost all level of datacentre scale and complexity. 
Generally, the combination of DC and VC (VC + DC) 
leads to significant performance improvement over VC. 
However, the extent of this improvement is application and 
context dependent. Results show that there are circumstances 
in which performance improvement is evident from VC + DC 
as well as circumstances in which improvement is not evident. 
Complex applications with the possibility of unexpected 
behaviour patterns, e.g., large scale datacentres with complex 
algorithms, will usually experience improvement with VC + 
DC. Also, applications that are sensitive to fluctuating 
environmental inputs (i.e., depend on volatile environmental 
information for decision-making), for example, auto stock 
trading systems are expected to see greater benefit from VC + 
DC. On the other hand, there are applications that are not 
expected to see any benefit.  Example includes small scale 
datacentres with predefined request rate and request capacity. 
V. CONCLUSION  
This paper has presented a new trustworthy autonomic 
architecture (TAArch). Different from the traditional 
autonomic solutions, TAArch consists of inbuilt mechanisms 
and instrumentation to support run-time self-validation and 
trustworthiness. The architecture guarantees self-monitoring 
over short time and longer time frames. At the core of the 
architecture are three components, the AutonomicController, 
ValidationCheck and DependabilityCheck, which allow 
developers to specify controls and processes to improve 
system trustability. We have presented a case example 
scenario to demonstrate the workings of the proposed 
approach. The empirical analysis case example scenario is an 
implementation of a datacentre resource request and 
allocation management designed to analyse the performance 
of the proposed TAArch architecture over existing autonomic 
architectures. Results show that TAArch is sufficiently 
sophisticated to operate efficiently and yield satisfactory 
results under almost all perceivable operating circumstances. 
Analyses also show that the proposed architecture achieves 
over 42% performance improvement (in terms of reliability) 
in a complex operating circumstance. It is also safe to 
conclude that the proposed trustworthy autonomic 
architecture has significant performance improvement over 
existing architectures and can be relied upon to operate (or 
manage) almost all level of datacentre scale and complexity. 
The importance of trustworthiness in computing, in 
general, has been echoed in the Computing Research 
Association’s ‘four grand challenges in trustworthy 
computing’ [31] and Microsoft’s white paper on Trustworthy 
Computing (TC) [32]. The Committee on Information 
Systems Trustworthiness in [33] defines a trustworthy system 
as one which does what people expect it to do – and nothing 
more – despite any form of disruption. Although this 
definition has been the driving force for achieving 
trustworthiness both in autonomic and non-autonomic 
systems, the peculiarity of context dynamism in autonomic 
computing places unique and different challenges on 
trustworthiness for autonomic systems. Validation for 
example, which is an essential requirement for 
trustworthiness, can be design-time based for non-autonomic 
systems but must be run-time based for autonomic systems. 
Despite the different challenges, it is generally accepted that 
trustworthiness is a non-negotiable priority for computing 
systems. For autonomic systems, the primary concern is not 
how a system operates to achieve a result but how dependable 
is that result from the user’s perspective. For complete 
reliance on autonomic computing systems, the human user 
will need a level of trust and confidence that these systems 
will satisfy specified requirements and will not fail. It is not 
sufficient that systems are performing within requirement 
boundaries, outputs must also be seen to be reliable and 
dependable. This is necessary for self-managing systems in 
order to mitigate the threat of losing control and confidence 
[34]. We posit that such capabilities need to be built in as 
integral part of the autonomic architecture and not treated as 
add-ons. 
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The traditional MAPE-based autonomic architecture as 
originally presented in [2] has been widely accepted and 
autonomic research efforts are predominantly based on this 
architecture’s control loop. We must admit that a good 
research success has been achieved using the MAPE-based 
architecture. However, we suppose, like others, e.g., [7][10], 
that this architecture is vague and thus cannot lead to the full 
goal of autonomic computing. For example, the MAPE-based 
architecture does not explicitly and integrally support run-
time self-validation, which is a prerequisite for 
trustworthiness.  
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APPENDIX A: TAArch Application 
 
The simulations of this paper are performed using the TAArch 
Application. To understand the workings of the application let us 
consider Figure A, which is a screen shot of a basic resource 
allocation simulation with 75 servers (x) and 4 applications (ix). The 
user selects the number of servers and applications and this will 
populate the Si and Aj pools respectively (labels x and ix). The 
application supports two experiments (‘Normal Simulation’ and 
‘Interoperability’, which is not covered here) as shown (iii) and in 
this case the ‘Normal Simulation’ option is selected, which will 
automatically check the PeM autonomic manager option (vi). Then 
the actual manager is selected, which in this case is the 
[AC+VC+DC] option representing all three managers. As shown 
(vii) the DZWidth can be manually controlled by the user or 
dynamically tuned by the system depending on which option is 
selected. Before the simulation starts it is possible to set the internal 
variables through (xiv) to user preferences. The possibility of 
changing the internal variables is deactivated (as shown by xiv) as 
soon as the simulation starts. Change of server capacity is also 
deactivated (i) as soon as simulation starts. Meanwhile, application 
size (i), which is an external variable, can be changed at any time in 
the simulation. Once all parameters are set the simulation can be 
started by clicking ‘Run Simulation’. For the purpose of this 
example the shutdown server pool Ši is not used (xi) –it is only used 
for the ‘Interoperability’ simulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Once the simulation starts, the manager starts populating the Ṳ 
pool (xiii). The view of this pool shows current and live updates of 
process status. ‘Available capacity’ shows running capacity available 
to serve individual application request while ‘Run’g requests’ are the 
total running individual request capacity. ‘Offset’ is the difference 
between running request capacity and available capacity. 
‘Server_ID’ shows the collection of servers currently providing 
services for individual application request. Depending on the number 
of servers in use, some of the allocated servers may no longer be 
visible in the Ṳ pool but can be viewed from the respective 
individual pool (xii). The provisioning servers, that is, servers that 
are been configured in the queue can be viewed through (ii). 
Individual results for the managers are displayed in (iv) and (v). Also 
as stated, data displayed below (viii) and in (ii) are for AC (sysAC). 
Although there is provision for live graphing of results through the 
‘Show Graph’ button, complete result values can be exported to 
Excel Sheet through the ‘Export Results’ button (vii). 
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Figure A: Simulation screen shot showing TAArch application front end. 
